Many philosophers think that perceptual contents are always general and shouldn´t be specified using singular terms. They believe that distal objects and properties don't essentially constitute perceptual contents. I will argue that this strategy doesn't provide a satisfactory account of content specification and fails to make sense of the common-sense intuition that the veridicality of our perceptual experiences isn't something fully independent of whether we perceive or not. Finally, I will suggest an alternative "singularist" standpoint in which distal objects do enter into visual contents, making perceptions and hallucinations fundamentally different types of experiences.
Pereira, F. (2008). Percepción, contenido intencional y singularidad. Revista De Filosofía, 64, Pág. 143–161. Retrieved from https://revfono.uchile.cl/index.php/RDF/article/view/17244
